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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to estimate the redistributive effects of the
European Union budget between 1995 and 1997 on the countries and regions of the EU.
This analysis focuses on the main items of revenue, expenditure and net fiscal balance.
The method adopted consists of two stages. First, we estimate the income elasticity of
European Union revenues, expenditures and fiscal balance in order to examine the
progressive degree of each instrument considered. Secondly, we analyse the impact of
each of these instruments on regional and national income in order to evaluate their
capacity to reduce differences in per capita income levels.
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar empíricamente la capacidad del
presupuesto comunitario para reducir las disparidades territoriales de renta, tanto a nivel
de países como de regiones, durante el periodo 1995-97. Dicho análisis se efectúa para
los principales conceptos de ingresos y de gastos, así como para el presupuesto en su
conjunto a través de los saldos fiscales. El procedimiento metodológico seguido consta
de dos fases. En primer lugar, se estima la elasticidad renta de los ingresos, gastos y
saldos fiscales comunitarios con el propósito de examinar el grado de progresividad de
cada uno de los instrumentos considerados y, en segundo lugar, se analiza el impacto de
dichos instrumentos en la renta regional y nacional con el fin de evaluar su capacidad de
incidir en la reducción de las disparidades territoriales de renta.
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21. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade one of the most hotly debated subjects in economics has been the
redistributive capacity of the European Union budget. Among the numerous arguments
in favour of active intervention the following stand out: its power to mitigate horizontal
equity problems due to the intervention of national governments1; its capacity to reduce
territorial income disparities, or disparities derived from the integration process2; its
ability to guarantee the existence of the European Union itself3; and its power to
mitigate the negative effects originated by possible asymmetric shocks generated by
monetary union4 5.
As a result of this last argument many studies have sought to estimate the redistributive
power of the central government in countries such as the United States and Canada
(considered as reference points for the European case), since this is one of the
requirements established by the monetary optimum areas theory6. The results obtained
vary considerably, depending on the revenue and expenditure categories taken into
account and on the econometric technique used. Thus, while Sala-i-Martin and Sachs
(1992) estimate the redistributive power of the United States federal government to be
about 40%, Von Hagen (1992) obtains far more restrictive results, around 10%.
Adopting an alternative method, Bayoumi and Masson (1995) estimate the regional
redistribution capacity of the United States' federal budget at around 22%, and that of
Canada at 39%. They conclude that the federal fiscal flows depend on the institutional
structure of each country, and that in Europe the spatial redistribution is carried out by
the national governments. Moreover, they consider, unlike Sala-i-Martin and Sach
(1992),  that the territorial redistributive capacity of the federal governments is more a
political option than an economic necessity for the performance of the European
Monetary Union.
                                                
1 See Davezies-Nicot-Prud’Homme (1996).
2 Among the numerous studies in favour of this argument the most important are the Cecchini Report
(1988), Padoa-Schioppa Report (1987) and Emerson et al. (1992).
3 See Cremer and Pestieau (1996).
4 Monetary Union supposes not only the transfer of monetary policy to the European Union, but also the
existence of substantial limits on fiscal policy established through Stability Programs, which reduce
national fiscal autonomy.
5 See, for example, Sala-i-Martín and Sachs (1992), Krugman (1993) and Goodhard and Smith (1993).
6 See Mundell (1961).
3All these studies have led to the development of empirical analyses which, though not
aimed at questioning the desirability of European Monetary Union, have estimated the
territorial redistribution capacity of the central government in a range of countries. In
this regard, Goodhart and Smith (1993) and Domenech-Maudes-Varela (2000) deserve
particular mention. Goodhart and Smith adapted the methodology used by Sala-i-Martín
and Sachs (1992) and Von Hagen (1992) to the cases of the United States, Canada and
Great Britain. They find that in the case of  the United States, an increase of one dollar
in the GDP of a region means an increase of 13 cents in the federal income taxes
collected, and only minor variations in the level of federal expenditure. The insurance
capacity of the tax is around 13%7. In the case of Canada, the insurance capacity of
federal taxes as a whole is 15%, while transfers to families or total transfers do not show
any considerable insurance effects. As for the United Kingdom, this study only analyses
income tax, obtaining an insurance capacity of 21%.
In their study, Domènech, Maudes and Varela carry out a similar analysis in order to
estimate the redistributive effects of the European Union budget on the member
countries between 1986 and 1998. They estimate the elasticity of a range of categories
of community expenditure and revenue in relation to the income of the member
countries through logarithmic regression. The estimation was carried out on a pool of
data which included temporal dummy variables in order to analyse simultaneously how
changes affect each region each year. The results obtained showed that the redistributive
impact of the fiscal flows between the member countries generated by the European
Union budget was considerable, particularly given the small size of this budget, and that
this redistributive effect has tended to increase over time, due basically to the effects of
the structural and cohesion funds. The elasticity of per capita community expenditure
estimated in ecus in relation to per capita income is -0.23, which implies a certain
degree of progressiveness, whereas revenues behave proportionally as the value of the
coefficient is very close to one.
The methodology used by Bayoumi and Masson (1995) was applied by Duboz and
Nicot (1998) in analysing the redistributive capacity of the German Federal government,
                                                
7 Goodhart and Smith (1993) suggest that the differences between the results of their study and those of
Sala-i-Martín and Sachs could be due, in part, to the fact that the latter use a much broader variable when
considering taxes, whilst they only use personal income tax.
4and by Barberán-Bosch-Castells-Espasa (2000) in analysing that of the Spanish central
government. In the first case, the results obtained show that the redistributive power of
the federal budget is around 40%, and that this percentage remained practically
unchanged after the unification process in 1991. In the Spanish case, the regional
income redistributive capacity of the central government budget is calculated at about
36%.
Mélitz and Zumer (1998) expanded on this study using a panel econometric date
technique to estimate the equation proposed by Bayoumi and Masson. The estimations
obtained show that redistribution is substantially greater in France and in the United
Kingdom than in the United States and Canada. In France, net transfers (revenue less
public expenditure) proceeding from the central government reduce the regional
disparities in income by 38%; in the United Kingdom the figure is 26% and in Canada
and the United States around 18% and 16% respectively.
Another way to quantify the regional redistributive capacity of the public sector is to use
macroeconomic models. This can be done in one of three ways: through simulations on
neo-classical models8, incorporating fiscal flows in endogenous growth models9, or
using  input-output tables10.
Though most analyses of this subject have been carried out in the last decade, we should
also mention the McDougall Report (1977), the pioneer study in the field, characterised
by its rigor and amplitude. This Report analyses the ability of the central governments
of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia,
Canada, Switzerland and the United States to reduce regional income disparities. The
Report draws three significant conclusions. The first is that regional differences in
income diminish strongly following the budget activity of the central government. In
                                                
8 Pisani-Italianer-Lescure (1993) use the simulation method to quantify the insurer effect of the central
governments of the United States, Germany and France; Jones and Whaley (1990) analyse the influence
of the fiscal flows generated by the federal government of Canada in six regions using a general
equilibrium model; and Blake (1995) also uses the macroeconomic simulation method to analyse the
regional effects when there are changes in the fiscal and monetary policies of the national government of
Great Britain.
9 See for example Pereira (1999), where he evaluates the effects of the European Funds in the four
cohesion countries.
10 Pola (1998) analyses the impact of the fiscal flows generated by the central government budget of Italy
through input-output regional tables.
5fact, the Report estimates that, on average, public sector activity reduces regional
differences by 40%, the single-state country budgets showing greater redistributive
power than those of federal states (46% in relation to 35%)11. The second major
conclusion is that, in general, the redistributive effect of public expenditure is much
greater than that of public revenue (35% and 5% on average, respectively). Thirdly, the
Report shows the existence of an inverse relationship between the sign and the volume
of regional fiscal and trade balances.
Following this line of research, the purpose of this paper is to estimate the redistributive
effects of the European Union budget between 1995 and 1997 on European countries
and regions. The analysis focuses on the main categories of  revenue and expenditure
and also on the budget as a whole using the net fiscal balance.
We should stress that the aim of this study is not to analyse whether the European Union
should play an active role in spatial redistribution or not, but to estimate the distributive
effect generated by its activity. Regardless of whether active intervention in the
territorial redistribution area by the European Union is justified, it is obvious that any
public budget has distributive effects and, in particular, that any budgetary action, either
regarding revenue or expenditure also has distributive effects, even though its objective
is not explicitly redistributive12. For this reason an understanding of the distributive
effects at national and regional levels is in itself of interest.
The procedure adopted consists of two stages. Firstly, we estimate the income elasticity
of the European Union revenues, expenditures and fiscal balance in order to examine
the degree of progressivity of each instrument considered. Secondly, we analyse  the
impact of these instruments on regional and national income so as to evaluate their
capacity to reduce the differences in per capita income levels.
In order to achieve the proposed objectives, the present paper is structured in five
sections, this introduction being the first of these. In the second section we explain the
                                                
11 
In fact, the redistributive power of central governments is estimated to be 29%in the case of Germany,
53% in Australia, 32% in Canada, 28% in the United States, and 22% in Switzerland (in this case social
security is not included). With regard to the single-state countries, the results obtained were 54% in the
case of France, 47% in Italy, and 36% in the United Kingdom.
12 See Mc Dougall (1992) and Castells (1998a).
6methodology applied, while in the third we describe the characteristics of the data used.
In the fourth we estimate the redistributive effects of the budget of the European Union,
and present our main conclusions in the fifth and last section.
2. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used to analyse the redistributive effects of the European Union
budget combines the elasticities method introduced by McDougall (1977) and the
disposable income method developed by Bayoumi and Masson (1995).
Thus, first we estimate the elasticity-income of the regional and national European
Union revenues, expenditures and fiscal balance so as to examine the progression of
each instrument considered.
Following the McDougall report (1977), the coefficients of elasticity are obtained by
regression, where regional and national taxes and expenditure are the dependent
variables and the initial income is the independent variable. Initial income is defined as
the income existing before the activity of the public sector. The difference between our
method and that used by McDougall is that we take the variables as logarithms.
Consequently, the coefficients of the slopes are the estimated elasticities.
The estimated equation is:
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where,
X is the taxes or expenditures in each region in per capita terms.
Y is the initial income of the regions (or countries) in per capita terms.
j refers to different types of revenue and expenditure.
i refers to the regions (or countries).
m refers to average values for the total of regions (or countries).
The variables used are average values for the period 1995-97.
7As the reader may have noticed, this method is very similar to the one used by Sala-i-
Martín and Sachs (1992). However, they used time series in their estimations, while we
use cross-section data.
The elasticities obtained indicate the change in regional (or national)  revenues and
expenditures when the regional (or national) income changes. If the slope is equal to
one, the tax or expenditure is neutral, which means that it varies from one region (or
country) to another in the same proportion as the initial income. Consequently, these
fiscal instruments do not modify the initial differences in relative regional (or national)
income. Taxes with elasticities above one are progressive, while expenditures with
elasticities above one are regressive.
In the case of fiscal balances, the elasticity-income is estimated using the equation
developed by Castells (1998a), where the dependent variable is the ratio between fiscal
balance and regional (or national) income. We add one to this ratio to avoid negative
values. Thus, we estimate the following equation:
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where
SF is the regional (or national) fiscal balance with the European Union budget.
Once the degree of progressivity of the various instruments of revenues, expenditures
and fiscal balance is analysed, we study its redistributive capacity, which depends not
only on the degree of progressivity but also on its relative importance in the regional (or
national) income. It may be that an revenue or expenditure item is very progressive but
that its importance in regional (or national) income is very small. In this case, the
redistributive effect of this instrument is very low. Likewise, an revenue or expenditure
item may not be very progressive but its importance in regional (or national) income is
large; in this case the redistributive effect may be greater. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider the progressivity of the instruments and their involvement in reducing
territorial income disparities.
8For the analysis of this second aspect we use the method developed Bayoumi and
Masson (1995). Using cross-section regression analysis we estimate the following
equation:
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where
Y is the initial income, in other words, the income existing before the activity of the
public sector, in our case the European Union. We use Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as the initial income since it is the primary magnitude of income for the
European regions.
YF is the final income, which is equal to the initial income (Y) modified by the activity
of the European Union. To obtain the final income, revenue obtained by the public
sector is subtracted from the initial income and public expenditure is added.
i  refers to regions or  countries.
m refers to average values for all regions or countries.
The variables Y and YF are average values in per capita terms for the 1995-97 period.
The estimated value for the coefficient “β” indicates the relationship between the final
income (YF) and the initial income (Y) and is understood in redistributive terms. For
example, a coefficient of 0.70 indicates that 70 percent of the initial differences in
relative per capita incomes remains after public sector activity, and that this reduces
30% of each ecu of difference between the regions or the countries. Therefore, (1-β)
represents the amount of income redistribution caused by fiscal flows derived from the
European Union budget.
The estimation of equation (3) was carried out starting from the following calculations
of the final income:
• YF = Y – European Union Revenue (distinguishing between the various typologies
of revenues). The value (1-β) shows the redistributive power of public revenue as a
whole and its different categories.
9• YF = Y + European Union Expenditures (also distinguishing the larger categories of
public expenditure). The value (1-β) indicates the redistribution derived from total
public expenditure and from its main categories.
• YF = Y + Regional or National Fiscal Balance with the European Union. In this
case, the value of (1-β) indicates the total redistributive power of the European
Community budget.
3. DATA CHARACTERISTICS
The data used in this study relating to revenue and expenditure, as well as to fiscal
balances, were taken from a previous study carried out by the author. Fiscal flows
derived from the activity of the European Union in the 15 member states and in the 121
regions during the 1995-97 period were quantified13. In this study the territorial data for
income and expenditure are the result of the estimation of the territorial incidence of the
resources and the expenditure of the European Union. The territorial assignation carried
out is based on economic incidence and it uses information from the Annual Reports of
the Court of Auditors. Specifically, we use effective revenues and payments made.
3.1. Territorial assignment of the revenues
Revenues are assigned territorially using the existing methodology which is based on
the hypotheses of tax incidence most suitable for each of the types of revenue. Hence,
we distributed total revenue between territories using the most appropriate statistical
indicators corresponding with these hypotheses of tax incidence. This procedure is
necessary, due to the possibility of ‘shifting’ the tax burden between individuals, which
means that the collection of taxes in a certain area does not necessarily correspond to
the taxes paid by its residents.
The hypotheses of the tax burden incidence established to assign the revenue of the
European Union territorially are those commonly used in the majority of theoretical and
empirical studies. Below, the hypotheses (of tax incidence) that we use to distribute
revenues between countries and regions are briefly outlined:
                                                
13 See Espasa (2000).
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• Net Traditional Resources. These resources include customs duties, agricultural
duties and sugar and isoglucose levies less their collection costs. It is considered that
these taxes are passed to the final consumer in the price, and therefore it is the
consumer that has to support the tax burden. Consequently, total revenues by
traditional resources have been distributed among regions and countries according to
the final consumption of households and not according to the revenue collected in
each area.
• VAT resources are the direct contribution of the member states to the European
Union.  Consequently we have supposed that there is no shifting of the tax burden
between countries. However, the contribution by VAT inside each State is assumed
to be borne by consumers to the extent that they suffer the tax burden. Thus, we
have assigned the effective contribution to each country, and this contribution has
been distributed among regions according to the regional distribution of national
consumption.
• The GNP resource is also a direct transfer from member states to the European
Union; so we have considered that the tax burden of this resource is totally
internalized inside each member State. Therefore, each country is assigned its
effective contribution, and this contribution has been assessed among the European
regions as a function of the regional distribution of the tax burden state to be borne.
• Finally, the revenues obtained through salary taxes on the Community Institutions’
personnel have been distributed among countries and regions according to territorial
distribution of the administrative expenditure.
11
3.2. Territorial assignment of expenditure
The analysis of the territorial assignation of public expenditure is as important as that of
revenues, but its estimation has not been as widely studied and it is more difficult to
carry out. According to Castells (1998b), the reason is that public expenditure, as it is
directed towards the production of services for their public provision, produces two
different effects. On the one hand, it finances services that are provided to consumers
without compensation and, on the other hand, it makes payments to acquire the
necessary resources (labour, supplies, equipment, installations, etc.) to produce those
public services. The first is a unilateral effect, without compensation, typical of the
public sector. The second is a bilateral effect, with compensation, as the recipients of
the payments always deliver something in exchange.
Consequently, studies of territorial aspects of expenditure can focus on either the
geographical location of the expenditure, or the place of residence of the individuals that
benefit from the service provided. The former is called the flow approach, and the latter
the determining benefit approach.
The approaches are not mutually exclusive, but they address different questions. The
purpose of the flow approach is to analyse the effect of expenditure on the economic
activity of the territory where the public goods and services are provided. The benefit
approach quantifies the impact of public consumption (public goods or public services).
Consequently, the territorial assignment of the Community’s expenditure among
countries and regions is made following these two criteria.
The usual practice in the territorial assignation of expenditure, in the flow approach, is
based on attributing the public expenditure to the region in which the expenditure
materialises, that is where the personnel, the use of current goods and services, the
receipt of the transfers and the investments are located. This is the criterion that we
applied. Hence we gave the flow approach a sense of 'reality', instead of giving it a
sense of ‘cash flows’, which would have led us to attribute the public expenditure to the
region in which the Administration makes its payment.
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Following this approach, the territorial assignation of public expenditure can be
relatively straightforward in that there is an accounting system which would allow all
categories of expenditure to be regionalised. When this happens the territorial
assignation of the expenditure is direct and immediate. Otherwise, it is necessary to
establish hypotheses about the territory where the expenditure is made and to select the
most suitable statistical indicators. Specifically, using this approach the expenditure is
assigned to the territory where the personnel are located, the purchase of current goods
and services are ascribed to the territory in which they are used (not where they are
acquired), investments in the region where they materialise, and transfers to the territory
where their final recipients reside.
The Annual Reports of the Court of Auditors provides information concerning
expenditure in the member states. However, regional information is only available for
expenditure on structural actions. Therefore, we need to establish some hypotheses to
determine the assignation of the remaining regional expenditures.
If we adopt the benefit approach, the assignation of community expenditure depends on
where the beneficiary resides, regardless of the allocation of the public production and
public investment. We will also establish a number of assumptions about the allocation
of the beneficiaries and about the quantification of the benefits that beneficiaries
receive. Finally, it is necessary to select the statistical indicators that most reliably
represent the beneficiaries of public goods and services.
In short, the territorial distribution of the major items of  European Union expenditure
has been carried out following the criteria described below:
• The administrative expenditures of the European Union are the only expenditure
category for which the Court of Auditors does not provide a break down of
information for each member state. This is because the Court considers
administrative expenditure to be indivisible and to produce external effects that
affect the population as a whole. However, the Commission did produce a Report
where the geographical distribution of the administrative expenditures
corresponding to the fifth draft of the financial perspectives were assigned  to each
of the member states. This distributive rule has been used in assigning the
13
administrative expenditures according to countries following the flow approach. The
breakdown  of this expenditure by regions is carried out following the distribution of
the personnel of the various Community Institutions.
In contrast, when adopting the benefit approach we considered that these
expenditures finance a public good for the whole community, since they produce
indivisible profits and external effects that reach the population as a whole.
Consequently,  the benefit approach distributes these expenditures among countries
and regions as a function of their population.
• The results of the territorial assignation of European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) following the benefit approach coincide with the results
obtained using the flow approach. These results coincide because the finality of this
fund is to guarantee the income of farmers and we, therefore, suppose farmers to be
the direct beneficiaries of these transfers. The territorial distribution of this
expenditure by member state is obtained directly from the Financial Report of
EAGGF, while the regional distribution can be obtained by applying the criteria of
intervention for each subsidised product, such as the area under cultivation,
production, number of  heads of cattle, etc..
• In considering the territorial impact of expenditure for structural action, we have
also assumed that the results provided by both approaches are the same. In this case,
we consider the benefits from these actions to remain within the territory which
receives the transfers. Obviously, the projects being financed might have external
effects even though they are located in another region. However, in practice it is
extremely difficult to determine the type of projects being financed in each region
and the extent of EU involvement. Clearly, this information is essential in
establishing a hypothesis of the incidence of possible "overflow" effects.
Information about payments made by the European Union in every country and
region is available, consequently in most cases the expenditure can be assigned
directly. In the remaining cases indicators related with the objectives of these
expenditures have been used.
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• Finally, when we consider the rest of the European Union's expenditures including
expenditure on research and development, external affairs and international aid
programmes and on the rest of internal policies the results obtained with both
approaches differ greatly. The reason for this is that these actions generate benefits
that, in general, affect the whole population. Therefore, following the benefit
approach population distribution is one of the main indicators of allocation.
However, in the case of the flow approach, the expenditure corresponding to these
policies is assigned to the territory for which it was originally intended.
4. ESTIMATES AND RESULTS
4.1. The redistributive power of European Union revenue
Our analysis of the redistributive capacity of community revenue was undertaken for
five categories of revenue: Traditional Own Resources (OWN), VAT resources
(including the resources originated by VAT, the excess revenues of previous budgets by
VAT and the British check or compensation), GNP Resources (corresponding to
revenues by this resource and the excess of previous budgets by GNP contribution),
Own Resources (OR) (defined as the aggregate of the three revenue categories above
(OR = TOR + VAT + GNP)) and Total revenues (TR) (determined as the sum of own
resources plus the “other revenues”, which basically are taxes on salaries of the
community personnel (TR = OR + other revenues).
We have not been able to estimate the elasticity of “other revenues” because the number
of observations when values differed from zero was very low. Nevertheless, its effect
can be analysed using the difference between the elasticity of own resources and the
elasticity of total revenues.
The elasticity of the European Union revenues for 1995-97 period has been estimated
using equation (1). The results are shown in table 1, which is divided in two parts, one
corresponding to the regional sample and the other to the country sample. Both
estimates have been carried out with the variables in ecus and PPS.
15
All the estimated income elasticities in the regional sample have a value lower than the
unity. Thus, the regressivity of the community revenues are shown as a composite set
and individually while the estimates were found to be lower when the variables are in
PPS. Specifically, the estimated income elasticity of total revenues is 0.969 when all
variables are expressed in ecus and 0.876 when they are in PPS. In the national sample,
the income elasticity of total revenues is higher than one (1.210 in ecus and 1.551 in
PPS). Therefore, it is possible to affirm that the financial system of the European Union
has a certain degree of progressivity at the national level, while it is slightly regressive
when it is analysed at the regional level.
If we examine different types of revenue, we should note that the VAT resource is
regressive in the regional sample, while it appears progressive in the national sample.
This outcome responds to the logic of the financial system, which in the last decade has
shown a reduction in its regressivity. This has been achieved through the reduction of
the maximum tax rate and also by changing the structure of the VAT resource
(limitation of its tax base and financing the British compensation through GNP).
However, those reductions are only undertaken at the national level and they do not
affect the regions. The GNP resource is the type of revenue that shows an income
elasticity closest to one both in the regional sample (b = 0.975 when the variables are
expressed in ecus and b= 0.949 in PPS), and in the national sample (in this case, its
elasticity is 0.983 in ecus  and 1.003 in PPS). In contrast, the traditional own resources
has an elasticity greater than one. Clearly, they are regressive in the two samples
analysed.
The sum of traditional own resources, VAT resource and GNP resource constitutes own
resources. The income elasticity of these resources is quite low in the regional sample
(b= 0.891 in ecus and b= 0.742 in PPS) and it increases to 0.965 and 0.968,
respectively, in the national sample. Finally, it can be seen that taxes on personnel
wages assigned to Institutions of the Community are the most progressive. This result is
due  to the difference in the elasticities of own resources and total revenues.
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Table 1
Estimation of the income elasticity of European Union revenues
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent variables Constant
Ind. V.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2 Constant
Ind.V.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
ln ( owniT /
own
mT )
-0.005
 (-0.37)
0.750
(23.29)***
0.82 -0.002
(-0.14)
0,598
(13,99)***
0.63
ln ( VATiT /
VAT
mT )
-0.003
(-0.08)
0.926
(11.41)***
0.53 -0.013
(-0.40)
0,712
(6,29)***
0.25
ln ( GNPiT /
GNP
mT )
-0.022
(-1.27)
0.975
(23.04)***
0.82 -0.017
(-0.98)
0,949
(15,75)***
0.68
ln ( ORiT /
OR
mT )
0.002
(0.12)
0.891
(22.65)***
0.82 -0.001
(-0.04)
0,742
(14,05)***
0.63
ln ( TRiT /
TR
mT )
0.022
(1.04)
0.969
(19.01) ***
0.76 0.021
(1.00)
0,876
(12,16)***
0.56
b) National Sample (n = 15)
ln ( owniT /
own
mT )
-0.067
(-2.29)**
0.816
(10.64)***
0.90 -0.059
(-1.98)*
0.704
(5.10)***
0.67
ln ( VATiT /
VAT
mT )
0.030
(0.65)
1.016
(8.50)*** 0.85
0.036
(0.78)
1.037
(4.97)***
0.66
ln ( GNPiT /
GNP
mT )
0.009
(0.598)
0.983
(25.32)*** 0.98
0.015
(1.02)
1.003
(14.60)***
0.94
ln ( ORiT /
OR
mT )
0.010
(0.39)
0.965
(14.88)*** 0.84
0.016
(0.65)
0.968
(8.47)***
0.85
ln ( TRiT /
TR
mT )
0.067
(1.08)
1.210
(7.43)*** 0.81
0.071
(1.26)
1.551
(5.95)***
0.73
OWN: Traditional Own Resources
VAT: VAT Resources
GNP: GNP Resources
OR: Own Resources
TR: Total Revenues
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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The redistributive power of the community’s revenue can be analysed using equation
(3) and adjusting the final income as follows:
YF = Y – Community Revenue (4)
The results obtained are shown in table 2.
The redistributive effect of total revenue at regional level is very small: 0.26% when
variables are in ecus and 0.27% when they are in PPS. This outcome is due exclusively
to “other revenues”, since own resources (traditional own resources, VAT resources and
GNP resources) widen regional income differences. Thus, the global effect is an
increase of regional disparities of –0.11% and 0.25%, depending on whether variables
are expressed in ecus or PPS.
The results of the redistributive power of revenues by country differ considerably. Here,
except for traditional own resources, the rest of revenues show a certain redistributive
capacity, with VAT having the greatest impact. Its redistributive power is 0.15% and
0.22%, respectively. The redistributive effect of total revenue among countries is 1.37%
when variables are in ecus and 2.45% when they are in PPS. These are higher values
than those obtained in the regional sample. Obviously, these results are in line with the
income elasticity estimations obtained previously. Consequently, it can be deduced that
the financing community system is more able to redistribute among countries than
among regions.
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Table 2
The redistributive power of European Union revenues
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent Variable:
Final income (YFi/YFm)
Constant
Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β) Constant Indep.V: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β)
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
Y – OWN
-0.001
(-7.86)***
1.0006
(135566)***
1.00 -0.06
-0.001
(-9.61)***
1.0008
(11364.9)***
1.00 -0.08
Y – VAT
-0.005
(-1.62)
1.0003
(3497)***
1.00 -0.03
-0.002
(-4.22)***
1.0015
(2692.1)***
1.00 -0.15
Y- GNP
-0.001
(-1.12)
1.0001
(12089)***
1.00 -0.01
-0.000
(-1.14)
1.0002
(7884.2)***
1.00 -0.02
Y- OR
-0.001
(-3.13)**
1.0011
(2736)***
1.00 -0.11
0.003
(-5.62)***
1.0025
(2183.2)***
1.00 -0.25
Y – Total Revenues
0.002
(1.51)
0.9974
(842.7)***
1.00 0.26
0.002
(1.28)
0.9973
(655.3)***
1.00 0.27
b) National sample (n = 15)
Y – OWN
-0.000
(-1.53)
1.0004
(6522.1)***
1.00 -0.04
-0.001
(-1.74)
1.0006
(3959.0)*** 1.00 -0.06
Y – VAT
0.001
(1.53)
0.9985
(1382.3)***
1.00 0.15
0.002
(1.60)
0.9978
(883.4)*** 1.00 0.22
Y- GNP
0.000
(0.80)
0.9998
(7120.2)***
1.00 0.02
3.059
(1.41)
0.9996
(4823.9)*** 1.00 0.04
Y- OR
0.001
(1.18)
0.9988
(1196.0)***
1.00 0.12
0.002
(1.31)
0.9981
(781.1)*** 1.00 0.20
Y – Total Revenues
0.012
(2.13)**
0.9863
(192.2)***
1.00 1.37
0.023
(3.61)**
0.9755
(160.9)*** 1.00 2.45
OWN: Traditional Own Resources
VAT: VAT Resources
GNP: GNP Resources
OR: Own Resources
TR: Total Revenues
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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4.2. The redistributive power of European Union expenditure
The estimation of the income elasticity of expenditures can be carried out using
equation (1) and by analysing four categories of expenditure: the expenditure derived
from the EAGGF (AGR), the expenditure on structural actions (STR), the expenditure
on research and development (R+D), and other internal policy expenditure (IP), where
expenditure on external affairs and administrative expenditure are included. Finally, we
also estimate the income elasticity for the whole of the community expenditure.
The redistributive power analysis has been carried out using the flow approach and the
benefit approach. Table 3 and 4 show the estimates of the income elasticities of
expenditures following the flow approach and the benefit approach, respectively.
Income elasticity values higher than one mean that expenditures are regressive, since an
increase in the share of regional income increases more than proportionally the
expenditure in that region with respect to the community average. In contrast,
elasticities lower than one mean that these expenditures are progressive.
Our results show that income elasticity for the whole of the community expenditure in
the regional sample is always negative and, therefore, we can say that expenditure is
progressive. This result is the same when applying the flow or the benefit approach and
whether calculated in ecus or PPS. Specifically, the income elasticity of total
expenditure when we use the flow approach is –1.061 in ecus and –1.901 in PPS, and it
is -1.294 and –2.248 when we use the benefit approach. Thus, it was observed that
expenditure was more progressive when applying the latter approach.
The coefficient of income elasticity under the flow approach is not statistically
significant in the national sample. On the other hand, when the estimation is carried out
following the benefit approach the coefficient has values that are clearly significant and
negative (b=-0.800 if the variables are in ecus and  b=-2.082 if they are in PPS). Hence,
European Union expenditure is progressive when it is assigned according to the benefit
approach.
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The most progressive expenditures in both samples are derived from structural actions.
Estimated coefficient is –2.519 and –3.886 in the regional sample, depending on
whether variables are defined in ecus or in PPS, and –1.947 and –3.648 in the national
sample. In this case, the results derived from applying the flow and benefit approach
coincide, since it is considered that the benefits remain inside the territory where the
expenditures are destined. The agricultural expenditure coefficient  is, in all cases, lower
than the unity, while in the member states the sample is not statistically significant. At
the regional level it is progressive but the coefficients are smaller  (b= -1.182 in ecus
and b= -2.346 in PPS) than those obtained for structural expenditures.
Expenditure in research and development is regressive in both samples when income
elasticities are estimated according to the flow approach. However, when this
expenditure is territorialized under the benefit approach it becomes slightly progressive.
Expenditures associated with the rest of  internal policies are statistically unreliable,
because the values of R are extremely low. Consequently, the explanatory capacity of
the model is low. Having said this though, it should be realised that the coefficient of
the estimated elasticity is lower than unity under both approaches when using the
regional sample, while in the national sample, these expenditures are highly regressive.
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Table 3
Estimation of the income elasticity of European Union expenditures
Flow approach
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent variables Constant
V.ind.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2 Constant
V.ind.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
ln (
AGR
iG /
AGR
mG )
-0.441
(-3.89)**
-1.182
(-4.29)***
0.14
-0.436
(-4.05)***
-2.346
(-6.22) ***
0.25
ln ( STRiG /
STR
mG )
-0.611
(-8.36)***
-2.519
(-14.17)***
0.63
-0.548
(-6.92)***
-3.886
(-14.01) ***
0.63
ln ( DRiG
+ / DRmG
+ )
-0.410
(-5.68)***
1.005
(5.73)***
0.22
-0.374
(-5.29)***
1.399
(5.65) ***
0.22
ln ( IPiG /
IP
mG )
-1.044
(-8.29)***
0.908
(2.96)***
0.07
-1.031
(-8.25)***
0.947
(2.17)**
0.04
ln ( TEiG /
TE
mG )
-0.127
(-1.68)*
-1.061
(-5.77)***
0.22
-0.094
(-1.23)
-1.901
(-7.11)***
0.30
b) National sample (n = 15)
ln (
AGR
iG /
AGR
mG )
0.045
(0.26)
-0.397
(-0.89)
0.06
0.068
(0.41)
-1.556
(-2.07)*
0.25
ln ( STRiG /
STR
mG )
-0.203
(-1.22)
-1.947
(-4.46)***
0.61
-0.146
(-0.68)
-3.648
(-3.73)***
0.52
ln ( DRiG
+ / DRmG
+ )
0.127
(0.74)
1.123
(2.49)**
0.32
0.126
(0.76)
1.766
(2.32)**
0.29
ln ( IPiG /
IP
mG )
0.163
(0.40)
2.515
(2.37)**
0.30
0.151
(0.39)
4.340
(2.46)**
0.32
ln ( TEiG /
TE
mG )
0.354
(1.54)
0.139
(0.23)
0.00
0.378
(1.56)
0.203
(0.18)
0.00
AGR: EAGGF-Guarantee
STR: Structural Actions
R+D: Research and Development
IP: Internal Politics (include also administrative expenditures and external affairs)
TE: Total Expenditures
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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Table 4
Estimation of the income elasticity of European Union expenditures
Benefit approach
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent variables Constant
V.ind.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2 Constant
V.ind.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2
a) Regional sample  (n = 118)
ln (
AGR
iG /
AGR
mG )
-0.441
(-3.89)***
-1.182
(-4.29)***
0.14
-0.436
(-4.05)***
-2.346
(-6.22) ***
0.25
ln ( STRiG /
STR
mG )
-0.611
(-8.36)***
-2.519
(-14.17)***
0.63
-0.548
(-6.92)***
-3.886
(-14.01) ***
0.63
ln ( DRiG
+ / DRmG
+ )
0.010
(6.05)***
0.223
(53.34)***
0.96
0.032
(2.48)**
-0.000
(-0.00)
0.00
ln ( IPiG /
IP
mG )
-0.063
(-4.54)***
0.024
(0.70)
0.00
-0.036
(-1.66)*
-0.249
(-3.31)***
0.09
ln ( TEiG /
TE
mG )
-0.161
(2.96)***
-1.294
(-9.80)***
0.45
-0.132
(-2.39)*
-2.248
(-11.62)***
0.54
b) National sample  (n = 15)
ln (
AGR
iG /
AGR
mG )
0.045
(0.26)
-0.397
(-0.89)
0.057 0.068
(0.41)
-1.556
(-2.07)*
0.25
ln ( STRiG /
STR
mG )
-0.203
(-1.22)
-1.947
(-4.46)***
0.61
-0.146
(-0.68)
-3.648
(-3.73)***
0.52
ln ( DRiG
+ / DRmG
+ )
0.013
(3.13)***
0.233
(22.16)***
0.97
0.026
(0.92)
-0.255
(-1.94)*
0.22
ln ( IPiG /
IP
mG )
0.165
(1.68)
0.395
(1.53)
0.15
0.176
(1.86)*
-0.151
(-0.35)
0.01
ln ( TEiG /
TE
mG )
0.117
(0.96)
-0.800
(-2.51)**
0.33
0.144
(1.14)
-2.082
(-3.59)***
0.50
AGR: EAGGF-Guarantee
STR: Structural Actions
R+D: Research and Development
IP: Internal Politics (include also administrative expenditures and external affairs)
TE: Total Expenditures
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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Tables 5 and 6 show the redistributive power of the whole of community expenditure
and their main categories, using the flow approach and the benefit approach
respectively. In the calculation, the estimation of equation (3) was carried out obtaining
the final income as follows:
YF = Y + Community expenditures (5)
The estimations made show that the community expenditure at the regional level
presents a redistributive effect of 1.59%, when the assignment of expenditure is made
according to the flow approach and variables are expressed in ecus and 5.84%, when the
territorial assignment is carried out under the benefit approach and the data are defined
in PPS. At the level of member states, expenditure taken as a whole is only significant
when its territorial imputation is calculated according to benefit flow. In this case, the
redistributive effect is 2.55% when the variables are defined in ecus and 4.51% in PPS.
Different results were obtained depending on the approach followed because of the
variation in research and development expenditure and, especially, in that of internal
policy expenditure. According to the flow approach both expenditures present a
negative redistributive power, the estimated value of which is –5.60% in ecus and –
10.03% in PPS. Under the benefit approach they have little redistributive capacity:
0.07% in ecus and 0.17% in PPS. We obtained similar results although less intense
when using the regional sample. This is due to the relative size of the samples and to the
fact that these expenditures have a significant weight in countries such as Luxembourg
and Belgium unlike the rest of the member states.
The expenditure with the greatest regional redistributive capacity (2.29% and a 3.90%
depending on whether variables are expressed in ecus or in PPS) is that made on
structural actions. Agricultural expenditure occupies the second place with  a
redistributive power of 1.11% and 1.75%. The same behaviour is shown by these two
categories of expenditure at the national level. Moreover these expenditures are always
more redistributive when using variables expressed in PPS than when they are defined
in ecus.
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Table 5
The redistributive power of European Union expenditure
Flow approach
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent Variable :
Final income (YFi/YFm)
Constant
Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β) Constant Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β)
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
Y + AGR
0.012
(7.50)***
0.9889
(600.9)***
1.00 1.11
0.019
(7.99)***
0.9825
(403.7)***
1.00 1.75
Y + STR
0.025
(6.37)***
0.9771
(248.1)***
1.00 2.29
0.042
(5.39)***
0.9610
(119.8)***
1.00 3.90
Y + (R+D)
-0.0002
(-1.79)*
1.0001
(10646.5)***
1.00 -0.01
-0.000
(-3.17)***
1.0003
(8469.6)***
1.00 -0.04
Y + IP
-0.015
(-3.05)***
1.0180
(212.373)***
1.00 -1.80
-0.022
(-3.75)***
1.0252
(172.7)***
1.00 -2.52
Y + Total Expenditure
0.022
(3.35)***
0,9841
(146.308)***
1.00 1.59
0.0389
(3.62)***
0.9691
(88.0)***
0.99 3.09
b) National sample  (n = 15)
Y + AGR
0.012
(2.31)**
0.9900
(208.2)***
1.00 1.00
0.021
(2.29)**
0.9822
(114.4)*** 1.00 1.78
Y + STR
0.017
(4.58)***
0.9853
(297.7)***
1.00 1.47
0.029
(3.61)**
0.9747
(129.0)*** 1.00 2.53
Y + (R+D)
-0.001
(-1.52)
1.0009
(2360.3)***
1.00 -0.09
-0.002
(-2.89)*
1.0017
(1945.3)*** 1.00 -0.17
Y + IP
-0.049
(-2.24)**
1.0560
(53.6)***
1.00 -5.60
-0.093
(-4.00)***
1.1003
(49.3)*** 0.99 -10.03
Y + Total Expenditure
-0.020
(-0.83)
1.0318
(46.6)***
0.99 -3.18
-0.045
(-1.38)
1.0582
(33.8)*** 0.99 -5.82
AGR: EAGGF-Guarantee
STR: Structural Actions
R+D: Research and Development
IP: Internal Politics (include also administrative expenditures and external affairs)
TE: Total Expenditures
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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Table 6
The redistributive power of European Union expenditure
Benefit Approach
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent Variable :
Final income (YFi/YFm)
Constant
Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β) Constant Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β)
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
Y + AGR
0.012
(7.50)***
0.9889
(600.9)***
1.00 1.11
0.019
(7.99)***
0.9825
(403.7)***
1.00 1.75
Y + STR
0.025
(6.37)***
0.9771
(248.1)***
1.00 2.29
0.042
(5.39)***
0.9610
(119.8)***
0.99) 3.90
Y + (R+D)
0.000
(3284.6)***
0.9997
(9858700)***
1.00 0.03
0.000
(21.66)***
0.9996
(47135.5)***
1.00 0.04
Y + IP
0.001
(16.1)***
0.9986
(11673.8)***
1.00 0.14
0.002
(13.29)***
0.9981
(6858.5)***
1.00 0.19
Y + Total Expenditure
0.039
(9.01)***
0.9645
(223.7)***
1.00 3.55
0.063
(7.50)***
0.9416
(109.3)***
0.99 5.84
b) National sample (n = 15)
Y + AGR
0.012
(2.31)**
0.9900
(208.2)***
1.00 1.10
0.021
(2.29)**
0.9822
(114.4)*** 1.00 1.78
Y + STR
0.017
(4.58)***
0.9854
(297.7)***
1.00 1.47
0.029
(3.61)**
0.9747
(129.0)*** 1.00 2.53
Y + (R+D)
0.000
(4509)***
0.9997
(15122778)***
1.00 0.03
0.000
(8.65)***
0.9995
(16535.6)*** 1.00 0.05
Y + IP
0.001
(1.49)
0.9993
(1467.9)***
1.00 0.07
0.002
(2.28)**
0.9983
(1110.8)*** 1.00 0.17
Y + Total Expenditure
0.030
(3.80)***
0.97455
(136.1)***
1.00 2.55
0.051
(3.45)**
0.9550
(67.1)*** 1.00 4.51
AGR: EAGGF-Guarantee
STR: Structural Actions
R+D: Research and Development
IP: Internal Politics (include also administrative expenditures and external affairs)
TE: Total Expenditures
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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4.3. Global redistributive power of the European Union Budget
Following the same procedure as with community revenue and expenditure, we first
examined the income elasticity of the fiscal balance, since this variable reflects the
territorial effects of the global activity of the European Union Budget. The regional
fiscal balance was obtained from the difference between the expenditure made (entry of
resources) and the income obtained (exit of resources) by the European Union in each
region and country.
The analysis of the fiscal balance uses both the flow and the benefit approach to
impute expenditures among territories. The results of the estimation of equation (2) are
shown in Table 7. In this case, the coefficients of the independent variables represent
the income elasticities of the fiscal balance generated by the community budget. If the
coefficient is negative then the whole of community budget is progressive since a
proportional increase in income reduces the share of fiscal balance more than
proportionally, while it is regressive when the estimated coefficient is positive.
The results of the estimations show that the regional fiscal balance derived from the
activity of the European Union is progressive, both when the analysis is conducted
according to the flow approach (-0.062 in ecus and –0.079 in PPS) and when following
the benefit approach (-0.071 in ecus and –0.0094 in PPS). The same is true when the
income elasticity of the fiscal balance is examined by member states. However, the
magnitude of this elasticity is lower and is not statistically significant when the fiscal
balance is calculated following the flow approach.
27
Table 7
Estimation of the income elasticity of the fiscal balance generated by the European
Union budget
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent Var. Constant
Ind. V.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2 Constant
Ind. V.: ln (Yi/Ym)
Coefficient b
R2
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
ln (1+ FMiSF / iY )
0.003
(0.85)
-0.0621
(-6.62)***
0.27)
0.005
(1.22)
-0.079
(-5.67)***
0.22
ln (1+
FB
iSF / iY )
0.002
(0.51)
-0.0712
(-8.00)***
0.36
0.0034
(0.897)
-0.094
(-7.05)***
0.30
b) National sample (n = 15)
ln (1+
FM
iSF / iY )
0.010
(1.98)*
-0.019
(-1.45)
0.14
0.011
(1.95)*
-0.018
(-0.74)
0.04
ln (1+
FB
iSF / iY )
0.005
(1.59)
-0.043
(-5.30)***
0.68
0.006
(1.76)
-0.075
(-5.20)***
0.68
FM: Flow Approach
FB: Benefit Approach
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
Our analysis of the redistributive effect generated by the European Union budget is
carried out by estimating equation (3), and by calculating the final income as that
resulting from the global activity of the European Union, that is:
YF = Y + SF (6)
where,
SF is the fiscal balance generated by the community budget.
Table 8 shows the estimation of the redistributive capacity of the European Union
following the two approaches for allocated community expenditure by region and by
country and in variables expressed in ecus and PPS.
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The results obtained show that the regional redistribution capacity of the European
Union via its revenue and expenditure policies is relatively small, and it is always
higher when expenditures are allocated territorially following the benefit approach.
Specifically, at the regional level the redistributive power reaches 1.87% when
expenditures are assigned according to the flow approach and variables are considered
in ecus, while it reaches 6.19% when expenditures are allocated following the benefit
approach and variables are expressed in PPS.
Nevertheless, at the national level the redistributive impact of the fiscal balance is
negative when we assess expenditures according to the flow approach (-1.87% in ecus
and –3.46% in PPS). However, when we use the benefit approach the redistributive
power is slightly higher than that obtained in the regional sample (3.94% in ecus and
6.98% in PPS).
Table 8
The redistributive power of the fiscal balance generated by the European Union budget
Variables in ECUS Variables in PPS
Dependent Var.:
Final Income (YFi/YFm)
Constant
Indep.V: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β) Constant Indep.V.: Yi/Ym
Coefficient β R
2 %(1-β)
a) Regional sample (n = 118)
Y + SFFM
0,024
(4,09)***
0,9813
(163,5)***
1,00 1,87
0,041
(4,09)***
0,9660
(93,6)***
0,99 3,40
Y + SFFB
0,041
(9,40)***
0,9614
(220,1)***
1,00 3,86
0,0657
(7,778)***
0,9382
(108,4)***
0,99 6,19
b) National sample (n = 15)
Y + SFFM
-0,009
(-0,45)
1,0187
(57,6)***
1,00 -1,87
-0,023
(-0,84)
1,0346
(39,2)*** 0,99 -3,46
Y + SFFB
0,043
(4,71)***
0,9606
(117,9)***
1,00 3,94
0,075
(5,57)***
0,9302
(72,6)*** 1,00 6,98
FM: Flow Approach
FB: Benefit Approach
i :  regions or countries
m: average of the regions or countries
Terms in brackets are t-statistics values
*** indicates a parameter significant at the 99% confidence level
** indicates a parameter significant at the 95% confidence level
* indicates a parameter significant at the 90% confidence level
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have  analysed the power of the European Union to diminish territorial
disparities in per capita income between regions and countries via its budget policy.
Although, the redistributive capacity of community revenue is very low, we show that it
is greater between countries than between regions. This is made apparent by the fact
that in the regional sample all of own resources (traditional own resources, VAT
resources and GNP resources) are regressive and increase regional income disparities,
while in the national sample only the traditional own resources are clearly regressive.
This behaviour responds to the logic of the financing system since the limitations
established at the national level to reduce regressivity do not extend to the regional
level. A clear example of this is the behaviour of the VAT resource. In the regional
sample this resource increases territorial disparities, while at the national level it shows
a capacity to reduce them. The GNP resource is, thanks to its design and structure,
practically neutral, while the traditional own resources are highly regressive in two
samples, although their capacity to increase territorial disparities is very low as their
specific weight is very small. Consequently, the only source of revenue that has a
progressive character is the tax on the wages and salaries of the personnel of the
Institutions of the European Union.
The power of the community expenditure to diminish regional income disparities is very
low, though greater when the territorial assignation of expenditure is undertaken
following the benefit approach. Nevertheless, community expenditure has a much
greater redistributive power than that shown by its revenues.
When we adopt the benefit approach, the capacity of community expenditures to
redistribute income among regions stands at 3.55% when the variables are defined in
ecus and 5.84% when they are expressed in PPS. On the other hand, when we adopt the
flow approach for the territorial assignation of expenditure, these percentages are 1.59%
and 3.09%, respectively.
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The redistributive power decreases when the analysis is carried out at the national level.
In this case, the redistributive capacity is 2.55% and 4.51%, when adopting the benefit
approach and depending on whether the variables are considered in ecus or in PPS. In
contrast, when we assign the expenditure to the country where the expenditure
materialises, community expenditure increases the national income disparities to 3.18%
when the variables are in ecus and to 5.82% when they are in PPS.
The expenditure with the greatest redistributive capacity is that made on structural
actions, with the regional sample showing the highest coefficient of estimated income
elasticity. The actual redistribution power is low since the expenditure on structural
actions has a relatively low weight in terms of overall regional income. Although
agricultural expenditure shows an income elasticity lower than one in both samples and
absorbs more than 50% of the European Union budget, its redistributive power is very
low. It is, in fact, estimated at around 2%. The expenditure on research and development
and on the rest of internal policies are regressive when these expenditures are
territorially allocated following the flow approach. Consequently, they increase the
national and regional income disparities. However, when these expenditures are
territorially assigned according to the benefit approach they have a small redistributive
power.
The redistributive power of the fiscal balance generated by the activity of the European
Union is lower, especially when the territorial assignation of expenditure is carried out
following the flow approach. In this case, the power of the European Union budget to
diminish regional disparities is 1.87% and 3.40%, depending on whether the variables
are in ecus or in PPS. At the national level, the activity of the European Union increases
the disparities to 1.87% when the variables are defined in ecus and to 3.46% when they
are expressed in PPS.
The estimates made applying the benefit approach provide evidence that the power to
diminish territorial disparities of income through the European Union budget is more
intensive: at the regional level the power is 3.86% in ecus and 6.19% in PPS and at the
national level it is 3.94% in ecus and 6.98% in PPS. This occurs because of the
behaviour of expenditures made in research and development and internal policies since
they become progressive when they are assigned following the benefit approach.
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In short, our empirical analysis demonstrates that the territorial redistributive power of
the EU is quite low (with a mean value standing at around 3.5%) when compared with
that of central governments. However, if we consider that the relative size of the
European Union budget, in terms of GDP (less than 2%), is quite small with respect to
those of  federal governments (in the United States the federal budget represents around
20% of the GDP, while in Canada it represents 18%) and the budgets of central
governments of unitary countries (in France it stands at around 45%, in the United
Kingdom, 34% and in Spain, 34%) then the redistributive power is in fact very high
Thus, the community budget includes certain instruments that are very progressive such
as structural actions and agricultural expenditure. Consequently, the redistributive
power can be increased in a number of ways, though here we mention just three
possibilities: i) increasing the more redistributive categories of expenditure ii)
increasing the progressivity of the European Union financing system iii) increasing the
size of the European Union budget.
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